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Abstract 
Artificial objects often subjectively look eerie when their appearance to some extent resembles a human, which is known 
as the uncanny valley phenomenon. From a cognitive psychology perspective, several explanations of the phenomenon 
have been put forth, two of which are object categorization and realism inconsistency. Recently, MacDorman and 
Chattopadhyay (2016) reported experimental data as evidence in support of the latter. In our estimation, however, their 
results are still consistent with categorization-based stranger avoidance. In this Discussions paper, we try to describe 
why categorization-based stranger avoidance remains a viable explanation, despite the evidence of MacDorman and 
Chattopadhyay, and how it offers a more inclusive explanation of the impression of eeriness in the uncanny valley 
phenomenon. 
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Motivation of this commentary 
Recently, MacDorman and Chattopadhyay (2016) 
proposed that the consistency of realism among 
human morphological features, rather than object 
categorization, is a critical factor determining 
eeriness in the uncanny valley phenomenon (Mori, 
MacDorman, & Kageki, 2012). Although we 
understand what they are suggesting, at this stage we 
feel that the critical part of their proposal is also 
compatible with the categorization-based 
explanation, that is, with categorization-based 
stranger avoidance (Yamada, Kawabe, & Ihaya, 
2013). Here, we describe why we believe this and 
discuss scenarios where the categorization-based 
stranger avoidance can still be one of the factors 
contributing to the production of the uncanny valley 
phenomenon. 
 
Categorization-based stranger 
avoidance 
  First, let us describe how categorization-based 
stranger avoidance can explain eeriness in the 
uncanny valley phenomenon. Categorization-based 
stranger avoidance was first proposed by Yamada, 
Kawabe, and Ihaya (2013). In their Experiment 1, 
they used morphed images of real, stuffed, and 
cartoon human faces as stimuli and measured both a 
likability score and categorization latency to classify 
each image into a given categorization class. They 
found that the likability score was lowest when the 
categorization latency was highest. In their 
Experiment 2, they replicated the results using 
stimulus images of real, stuffed, and cartoon dog 
faces. 
  Importantly, in their Experiment 3, they observed 
that the likability score did not drop even when the 
categorization latency increased, wherein the 
categories the observers needed to judge were both 
related to humans (gender or identity).  
  The results of Experiments 1 and 2 are apparently 
inconsistent with the results of Experiment 3; 
however all of the results can be consistently 
interpreted by the categorization-based stranger 
avoidance Yamada, Kawabe, and Ihaya (2013) 
proposed. In Experiments 1 and 2, images with the 
highest categorization latency could have an 
improbable appearance, such as a cartoon-like real 
human face. In this case, the observers might first 
try to categorize the stimuli into a novel class. In 
other words, an object with such an improbable 
appearance is not categorized into already acquired 
classes of objects, is probably judged as a stranger 
to be avoided, and, consequently, has a low likability 
score. In this scenario, the categorization latency 
might increase because the object category inferred 
from the stimulus appearance does not exist in a 
given set of category classes for the task. On the 
other hand, in Experiment 3, images with the highest 
categorization latency could have a probable 
appearance, such as a boyish girl face. In this case, 
the observer might try to categorize the stimuli into 
a familiar class. That is, an object with such a 
probable appearance is categorized into already 
acquired classes of objects, is not judged to be a 
stranger to be avoided, and thus does not have low 
likability. In this scenario, the object category exists 
in a given set of categorization classes. On the other 
hand, because the category classes are too similar to 
each other, it may take time for the observer to 
discern which category is appropriate for the task.  
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  In this respect, we emphasize that stranger 
avoidance is not driven simply by the categorization 
difficulty that can be quantified by measuring 
categorization latency. Rather, it is triggered when 
an object has an improbable appearance and is 
therefore categorized into a novel class.  
  The existence of categorization-based stranger 
avoidance is supported by other lines of research. 
Using morphed images of a tomato and a strawberry 
as stimuli, Yamada, Kawabe, and Ihaya (2012) 
investigated how observers judged the willingness 
to eat. Consistent with Yamada, Kawabe, and Ihaya 
(2013), the results showed that the rating score for 
the willingness to eat was lowest when the rating 
scores for categorization confidence was lowest and 
thus when the food category was perhaps 
improbable (such as a tomato-like strawberry). In 
addition, they investigated how individual 
differences in food avoidance behavior, i.e., food 
neophobia (Rozin & Fallon, 1980), could modulate 
the willingness to eat and found that the rating score 
for the willingness to eat further decreased for 
participant groups with high food neophobia scores 
when categorization confidence was lowest. That 
the negative impression of foods in morphed images 
was enhanced by individual differences in food 
neophobia indicates that the categorization of the 
foods in morphed images into a novel class possibly 
causes the negative impression of the foods, and it 
supports the idea that the difficulty in categorizing 
an object into a novel class is one of decisive factors 
determining the eeriness impression. 
 
How stranger avoidance explains 
MacDorman and Chattopadhyay 
  MacDorman and Chattopadhyay (2016) used 
morphing images of a 3D model face and real 
human face and investigated the relationship 
between the categorization difficulty (or 
categorization ambiguity) and eeriness impressions. 
They found that the eeriness impression did not peak 
at the morph rate with the most ambiguous 
categorization and that it basically decreased as the 
morph rate of the real human face with the 3D model 
face increased while horizontal shifts of eeriness 
impression functions occurred in the morph rate 
dimension. On the basis of the data, MacDorman 
and Chattopadhyay tried to rule out categorization-
related mechanisms from the explanation for 
eeriness in the uncanny valley phenomenon.  
  On the other hand, we suggest that their results 
are not sufficient to deny the involvement of object 
categorization in the uncanny valley phenomenon 
and that they are indeed consistent with the 
categorization-based stranger avoidance 
explanation. As MacDorman and Chattopadhyay 
acknowledged, the 3D model was the eeriest among 
the stimuli they used. That is, it could have the most 
improbable appearance of “a real human who has 
3D-model like facial features.” The stranger 
avoidance theory predicts that the eeriness 
impression will decrease as the morph rate increases 
in the stimulus setting of MacDorman and 
Chattopadhyay because their stimulus images 
gradually take on a more probable appearance of “a 
real human who has real human-like facial features.” 
As the morphing rate increases, and the image can 
be better categorized into a familiar class. Actually, 
this was what MacDorman and Chattopadhyay 
observed. Cheetham, Suter, and Jancke (2014) also 
reported non-negative impressions for an 
ambiguous figure created by morphing between 
avatar and human images. The results are also 
consistent with categorization-based stranger 
avoidance: because the avatar originally produces 
the most negative impressions, the morphed image 
between it and human faces cancels the avatar’s 
improbable appearance and the image is more likely 
categorized into a familiar class such as human. 
  MacDorman and Chattopadhyay explained why 
they used the limited range of stimulus category in 
the following way: “From the standpoint of 
experimental control, it is difficult to investigate 
transitions along a human similarity dimension” 
(page 192). We appreciate that this is, in a sense, the 
proper attitude for a scientist who is trying to 
appropriately manipulate experimental components 
without potential artifacts. However, to rule out the 
involvement of the categorization-based 
explanation in a fair manner, they should have used 
a stimulus category dimension with a wider range 
containing a non-human entity, an ambiguous entity, 
and a human being. Although MacDorman and 
Chattopadhyay pointed out the potential 
involvement of morphing artifacts in previous 
studies, not all of the morphing images used as 
stimuli in those studies necessarily had such artifacts 
that caused negative impressions. Moreover, recent 
studies (Ferrey, Burleigh, & Fenske, 2015; Sasaki, 
Ihaya, & Yamada, submitted) show that the eeriness 
impression is strongest when categorization is the 
most ambiguous and possibly the most improbable. 
In addition, in Ferrey, Burleigh, and Fenske (2015), 
the eeriest impressions occurred when they used 
morphed images between different kinds of animals 
as stimuli. The eeriness impression’s occurring 
between different animal categories is out of scope 
for the realism inconsistency hypothesis but is well 
explained by the categorization-based stranger 
avoidance. 
 
Two theories: 
Independent of each other? 
  We have so far argued that the results reported by 
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MacDorman and Chattopadhyay are also consistent 
with the categorization-based stranger avoidance 
hypothesis. We do not intend to imply that our 
theory is an exclusive explanation of the eeriness in 
the uncanny valley phenomenon. Actually, our 
theory relies on the perception of object appearance 
improbability to determine how novel an object 
category is. The evaluation of the appearance 
improbability is consistent with the evaluation of the 
realism inconsistency (MacDorman & 
Chattopadhyay, 2016) or perceptual mismatch 
(Brenton, Gillies, Ballin, & Chatting, 2005; 
MacDorman, Green, Ho, & Koch, 2009; Kätsyri, 
Förger, Mäkäräinen, & Takala, 2015). On the other 
hand, our theory posits that after recognizing the 
improbable appearance, the brain categorizes the 
object into a novel class and recognizes the object as 
a stranger to be avoided. We consider 
categorization-based stranger avoidance to be a kind 
of hybrid idea between category-based explanations 
and appearance-based explanations such as realism 
inconsistency and perceptual mismatch. Our 
definitions of object categorization and improbable 
appearance are not new and are possibly similar to 
the definitions (i.e., category conflict and feature 
atypicality) proposed in a previous study (Burleigh, 
Schoenherr, & Lacroix, 2013). 
  The uncanny valley phenomenon has been found 
in a continuum of stimulus appearances from non-
human to human (Mori, MacDorman, & Kageki, 
2012), but there is room to discuss whether it can be 
extended to dimensions not directly related to 
human. The appearance-based explanation 
emphasizes the deviation of an object’s appearance 
from a human one as the decisive factor causing 
eeriness in the uncanny valley phenomenon 
(Brenton, Gillies, Ballin, & Chatting, 2005; 
MacDorman, Green, Ho, & Koch, 2009; Kätsyri, 
Förger, Mäkäräinen, & Takala, 2015). It thus 
focuses on human likeness in the stimulus 
continuum from non-human to human. On the other 
hand, the categorization-based explanation does not 
always focus on human likeness. It thus assumes a 
more general cognitive function to emotionally 
evaluate an object on the basis of categorization 
(Yamada, Kawabe, & Ihaya, 2012, 2013, Yamada, 
Sasaki, Kunieda, & Wada, 2014). Unfortunately, no 
study has thoroughly investigated whether the 
mechanism underlying eeriness impressions is 
different between the continuum between non-
human and human categories and the continuum 
between two non-human categories. Addressing this 
issue may provide more suitable explanations for the 
uncanny valley phenomenon. 
 
Relation with inhibitory devaluation 
  The eeriness impression can be explained in terms 
of an idea that is different from our theory but based 
on object categorization. One of the strongest 
theories is inhibitory devaluation (Ferrey, Burleigh, 
& Fenske, 2015). Ferrey, Burleigh, and Fenske 
(2015) reported experimental data similar to the data 
of Yamada, Kawabe, and Ihaya (2013) but gave a 
different account of the data. In their theory, when 
an object categorization is ambiguous, inhibition is 
triggered to resolve conflict between competing 
stimulus-related representations, and this causes the 
inhibitory devaluation. The inhibitory devaluation is 
an emotional evaluation phenomenon that generally 
occurs in attentionally inhibited object (Frischen, 
Ferrey, Burt, Pistchik, & Fenske, 2012; Raymond, 
Fenske, & Tavassoli, 2003).  
  We acknowledge that inhibitory devaluation can 
explain most of the reported data on the eeriness 
impression in the uncanny valley phenomena. On 
the other hand, it does not fully explain the data 
reported in Experiment 3 of Yamada, Kawabe, and 
Ihaya, wherein they showed that the morphed image 
between a male and female facial photograph (or 
between different male individuals) did not strongly 
produce eeriness. It is possible that because the 
morphed images between a male and female are 
categorized into either of familiar classes (male or 
female), the devaluation might not occur. For the 
theories of both stranger avoidance and inhibitory 
devaluation, there are issues to address. For stranger 
avoidance, it is necessary to further test when the 
difficulty in categorizing an object into a novel class 
occurs. For inhibitory devaluation, it is necessary to 
examine what category condition causes the 
devaluation. 
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